A void COC cannot give rise to a valid candidacy

By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico

My fellow Sigma Rhoan from the UP College of Law, retired Justice Antonio Carpio, quoted the case of EFREN RACEL ARATEA, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents (G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012), in his recent column in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, which decision he had penned for the Supreme Court en banc.

He said that this interesting case affects the petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy (COC) of former Senator Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., who is running for President in the forthcoming 2022 elections.

The case started when Romeo Lonzanida and Estela Antipolo both ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 elections.

A petition for disqualification was filed against Lonzanida, alleging that he had served as mayor already for 3 consecutive terms. It was argued that he made a false material representation in his COC that he was eligible.

Subsequently, the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled Lonzanida’s COC. His motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc remained pending during election day, when Lonzanida and Efren Aratea were elected and thereafter proclaimed as mayor and vice-mayor, respectively.

Aratea became acting mayor without prejudice to the outcome of the pending COMELEC case. At this point, the decision mentioned that the DILG issued a memorandum, stating that Lozanida “was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction.”

Then, COMELEC en banc disqualified Lonzanida.

Antipolo immediately filed a motion to intervene which Aratea opposed.

But COMELEC en banc decided in favor of Antipolo, ordered her proclamation and voided the proclamation of Lonzanida on 2 grounds: “first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisión correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.”

Aggrieved, Aratea filed the present petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court held that “Antipolo, the alleged “second placer,” should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.”

It dismissed Aratea’s petition and affirmed the resolution and order of the COMELEC en banc, directing the proclamation of  Antipolo as the duly elected mayor.

The Court cited Sec. 65 of the Omnibus Election Code and the Local Government Code on the qualifications of elective local officials. It quoted Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, thus:

“Sec. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; x x x.”

It also quoted Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code:

“Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.”

It also cited Sec. 78 and Sec. 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Sec. 78  states that a COC “may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy”. On the other hand, Sec. 74 details the contents of the certificate of candidacy, which provides, among others, that the “person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; x x x.”

The Court said that:

“The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public officeThis perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.”

It explained that “(t)he penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,  the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of “deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Codeperpetual special disqualification means that “the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.”  

The Court noted that Sec. 74 of the Omnibus Election Code “requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that “the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office.

Applied to the case at bar, the Court said that “the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office he seeks election. x x x. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida’s representation that he was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.”

Now, the following pronouncement by the Court affects the pending case of former Senator Marcos, Jr., according to Justice Carpio:

Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.”

“Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.” The disqualification of a convict to run for elective public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of “all the laws” relating to the conduct of elections.”

What is the effect of a void COC? The Court answered it in this manner: “A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.”

It stated in no uncertain terms that “Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.”