By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico
This interesting case, MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., petitioners,
vs. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, respondents, G.R. No. 135306, promulgated on January 28, 2003, started when Bulgar, a daily tabloid, published an article on Aug. 1, 1992, which read:
“ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang ‘Ramadan’.”
This prompted the “ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO,” to file with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages “in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR.”
The complaint alleged that “the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.”
In their answer, the defendants argued that “the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.”
The RTC “dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified x x x.” However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. Petitioners then filed this instant petition for review, “assailing the findings of the appellate court (a) on the existence of the elements of libel, (b) the right of respondents to institute the class suit, and, (c) the liability of petitioners for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.”
At the outset, the Supreme Court stated that “(d)efamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person’s character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements.” It added “that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.”
The Court explained that “(d)eclarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action, without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.”
Applying the foregoing principles, the Court said that “there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper.”
The Court explained that if “the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no application to anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not only does the group as such have no action; the plaintiff does not establish any personal reference to himself. x x x. In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word “Muslim” is descriptive of those who are believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon political and theological distinctions. “Muslim” is a name which describes only a general segment of the Philippine population, comprising a heterogeneous body whose construction is not so well defined as to render it impossible for any representative identification.”
The Court then concluded that “the statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages.”
The Court added that the “respondents’ lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit. x x x, “an element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.”
“The rules,” the Court said, “require that courts must make sure that the persons intervening should be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned. In the present controversy, Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity of their interests with those they seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that there can be a safe guaranty that those absent will be adequately represented by those present, a class suit, given its magnitude in this instance, would be unavailing.”
Finally, on the issue of damages, the Court said that “(u)nfortunately, neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages would appear to have been adequately established by respondents.”
Mr. Justice Josue Bellosillo, who penned this decision ofr the Court en banc quoted Voltaire, thus:
“I may utterly detest what you write, but I shall fight to the death to make it possible for you to continue writing it.”
Then, citing the famous dissenting opinion of Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 630, he wote:
“VOLTAIRE’S PONTIFICAL VERSE bestirs once again the basic liberties to free speech and free press — liberties that belong as well, if not more, to those who question, who do not conform, who differ. For the ultimate good which we all strive to achieve for ourselves and our posterity can better be reached by a free exchange of ideas, where the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the free market — not just the ideas we desire, but including those thoughts we despise.”
May I repeat, my dear Reader, the phrase “including those thoughts we despise.”
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision f the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
