By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico
The title of today’s case should have been “AN ORDINARY, PLAIN-LOOKING 43-YEAR-OLD WOMAN WITH TWO (2) TEEN AGED CHILDREN”. Its too long. So, I cut it. This phrase was used by a lawyer to refer to his married paramour. I had wanted to ask him: Was it worth it? But that is jumping the gun.
Let me begin by stating that in 1992, Susan started working at the Court of Appeals. In 1998, she married Rey. From November 2000 until March 2006, or for around 5 years, she had an adulterous relationship with Atty. Jun, a Division Clerk of Court at the Court of Appeals, who was, in turn, married to Atty. Joy.
On April 18, 2006, Rey received an anonymous text message informing him about Susan’s affair. He confronted Susan, who denied it. On May 4, 2006, he got a text message from Atty. Joy. He confronted Susan again, who eventually broke down and admitted the same. The message stated:
“Rey, Jun and I were separating I will file an annulment anytime soon, although I’m in great pain, I ask for your apology and forgiveness for everything he is leaving for US and I hope he evolves into a strong and mature person there. D cya masamang tao, just emotional and easily manipulated. Sana don’t blame him entirely bee. he is d type that never initiate things. He is passive and tame. He was honest with me and I hope Susan would find d courage to tell d truth to you. I just pray for peace and fresh start for all of us. I just want to go on with my life and use above all these for my son’s sake. I love Jun and I appeal to you na sana wala ka maisip sa atin lahat. Just as I have accepted everything. Salamat sa panahon at pangunawa. God bless.”cralawlawlibrary
Subsequently, Susan executed an affidavit, admitting to her intimate relationship. Rey then filed an administrative complaint for disbarment with the Supreme Court against Atty. Jun, for “grossly immoral and indecent conduct which transgressed the high moral standards required for membership in the Bar.”
In his defense, Atty. Jun, “strongly refuted the accusation against him claiming that the same was baseless and unfounded and that the complaint for disbarment was merely calculated to harass, annoy and besmirch his reputation.” He even referred to Susan as “an ordinary plain-looking 43-year-old woman with two (2) teen aged children.”
On August 15, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). After due investigation, the IBP found that the charge had been sufficiently proven. It recommended that Atty. Jun be disbarred. This was then submitted to the Supreme Court.
At the outset, the Supreme Court stated that:
“Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.This proceeds from the lawyer’s bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s integrity, and the legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.”
The Court then said that it “subscribes to the IBP’s opinion that there was substantial evidence showing that Atty. Jun did have an illicit relationship with Rey’s legal wife,” noting from the “respondent’s Comment that he appeared to be perplexed as to whether or not he would admit his extramarital liaisons with Susan. x x x, Atty. Jun interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at the same time, he seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also observed that he devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat or intimidation was exerted upon the person of Susan, but not once did he squarely deny the affair itself.”
The Court stated that such “denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted. It is clear from Atty. Jun’s Comment that his denial only pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof, he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Susan.”
The Court examined the records and held that the handwritten notes and cards Susan sent to Atty. Jun “conveyed Susan’s affection towards him as she even referred to him as “hon” or “honey.” There were also gifts she gave him on special occasions such as signature shoes, watch and shirts. It also appeared that Susan frequently visited him in his office either to bring him food, fruits and other goodies or to invite him to lunch which apparently displayed her emotional attachment to him. Curiously, the foregoing was never refuted by Susan. Such “ego-boosting admissions” of Atty. Jun indeed proved that a consensual relationship between him and Susan existed.”
The Court also noted his attempts to win back Susan. “In one instance, Atty. Jun boarded Susan’s car and refused to alight unless she would talk to him. Susan had to seek the assistance of her officemates, x x x.” (He also) made several attempts to communicate with Susan in the hope of rekindling their relationship through letters and phone calls but she remained firm in her stand to avoid him.”
The Court finally noted that against “Rey’s overwhelming evidence of said harassments, he offered only denials which was self-serving and weak under the law on evidence.”
Undoubtedly, the Court found that Atty. Jun had engaged in an immoral act. But was this act a grossly immoral act to justify disbarment? “A grossly immoral act,” it said, “is one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. It is willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.”
The Court then concluded that “Atty. Jun’s intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife showed his moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. It manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, he has fallen below the moral bar. Such detestable behavior warrants a disciplinary sanction. Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside of marriage are considered disgraceful and immoral as they manifest deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.”
The Court added that “Atty. Jun’s misconduct and unrepentant demeanor clearly showed a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to the sanctity of marriage and marital vows, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril. Accordingly, the Court finds the need for the imposition of the extreme administrative penalty of disbarment.”
The Supreme Court then disbarred Atty. Jun and ordered that his name be stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Now, let me ask: Was it worth it?
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(A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015 – REY P. VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR., Respondent.)
