By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico
This is an interesting case, which happened during the time of manual elections. It involved the withdrawal and substitution of candidates, which did not comply with the relevant provisions of the Election Code, with dire consequences. These provisions were carried from the Election Code to the present Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, when the latter became effective in Dec. 3, 1985. And the hard lessons learned by the parties then are still applicable today.
On Jan. 4, 1980, “which is the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy in the January 30, 1980 elections, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed with the Election Registrar of Dolores, Quezon, his sworn certificate of candidacy for the office of vice-mayor of said municipality. Subsequently, however, but on the same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy.”
On Jan. 25, 1980, Crisologo Villanueva filed his sworn Certificate of Candidacy in Substitution. He substituted for Mendoza, as candidate for vice-mayor.
However, on Jan. 31, a day after the elections on Jan. 30, 1980, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Vivencio Lirio as the duly elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon. The Municipal Board of Canvassers considered all the votes cast in favor of Villanueva as stray votes since his certificate of candidacy was not given due course by the Commission on Elections. His name was not included in the certified list of official candidates.chanrobles.com: virtual law library
On Feb. 6, 1980, Villanueva filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of Lirio and prayed “that COMELEC should order the official counting of the votes that may have been cast in his favor and thereafter, to proclaim him as the duly elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon.”
On Feb. 21, 1980, COMELEC denied his petition. He then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied, prompting him to file this petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
In his petition, Villanueva argued “that the withdrawal of Narciso Mendoza’s certificate of candidacy was valid and effective, and therefore, his certificate of candidacy in substitution of Mendoza’s was, likewise, valid and effective.”
The Supreme Court quoted Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code, thus:
“Sec. 27. Withdrawal or cancellation of certificates of candidacy. — No certification of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdrawn or cancelled unless the candidate files with the office which received the certificate of candidacy or with the Commission, a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation at any time before the day of election.”
The Court said that “(t)here is absolutely no vagueness or ambiguity of the above provision, as to the need of a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation of a duly filed certificate of candidacy. That the withdrawal of Mendoza’s certificate of candidacy was not made under oath is not disputed. As such, the withdrawal produces no legal effect for failure to comply with the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law. Mendoza, therefore, for all legal intents and purposes, remained to be a candidate for vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon, up to January 30, 1980, the date of the elections, as correctly ruled by the COMELEC.”
It further stated that “(e)ven assuming that the questioned withdrawal is effective, under a liberal construction of the law as invoked by petitioner, which should not be the case when the terms of the statute are clear and unmistakable, still petitioner may not derive comfort therefrom for Mendoza’s withdrawal was made on January 4, 1980, on the very last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Substitution of a candidate by reason of withdrawal is proper only when such withdrawal is made after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. This is as, likewise, clearly provided by Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code.”
It added that “(w)hile it may be true as persistently pointed out by the petitioner that a certificate of candidacy duly filed may be withdrawn or cancelled at any time before the day of election, it does not necessarily follow that such withdrawn or cancelled certificate of candidacy may be the subject of substitution by another’s certificate of candidacy.” Then, it explained that “(f)or substitution to take place, the withdrawal must be effected after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. If the withdrawal was made prior to or on the said last day, as what happened in the instant case, substitution is not allowed. Hence, the person filing a certificate of candidacy is filing said certificate in his own right, not as substitute candidate, and the filing to make the certificate of candidacy valid must not be after the last day for filing ordinary certificates of candidacy, which is January 4, 1980.”
Thereafter, the Court concluded:
“By and large, petitioner was, therefore, not a candidate, either in substitution of Mendoza or in his own right, as he filed his certificate of candidacy on January 25, 1980, long after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Whatever votes may have been cast in his favor are necessarily considered stray votes. [Section 155 (15), Election Code] There is thus no legal basis for the annulment of respondent Lirio’s proclamation as vice-mayor.”
The case does not mention what happened to the lawyers of Mendoza and Villanueva, for this was certainly a costly mistake. They would have certainly blamed their lawyers for the rest of their lives.
Now, back to the case, the Court then held that the “COMELEC did not commit any error” and dismissed Villanueva’s petition, shattering his dream of becoming vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon.
Well, Villanueva could have started his campaign as the earliest bird for the next elections. But that would have been another story. (CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PAREDES, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES QUEZON, AND VIVENCIO G. LIRIO, Respondents, G.R. No. L-54718; May 31, 1983)
