By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico
The case of ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, Petitioner, v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents, G. R. No. 110503, decided by the Second Division of the Supreme Court on August 4, 1994, involved Samar (Officer-In-Charge/OIC) Gov. Antonio Bolastig, who was accused of the violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Justice Vicente Mendoza wrote the decision for Second Division.
On June 24, 1986, an Information was filed against Gov. Bolastig, Provincial Treasurer Pedro Ason and Property Officer Prudencio Macabenta, who were all members of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC), charging them with the violation of RA 3019, when they awarded and entered into “a purchase contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the purchase of certain office supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11″ x 17″ at a unit price of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for said item was only Fifty-Five Pesos (P55.00) or a total price of Five Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government in the total amount of Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00).”
On Jan. 5, 1993, Gov. Bolastig was arraigned. He entered a plea of not guilty.
On Jan. 25, 1993, the prosecution moved for his suspension based on Sec. 13, RA 3019, which stated:
“Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.”
Over the opposition of Gov. Bolastig, the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension on March 18, 1993 for 90 days. It held that “preventive suspension is mandatory under sec. 13, of Rep. Act No. 3019, pursuant to which all that is required is for the court to make a finding that the accused stands charged under a valid information “for any of the above-described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for suspension.”
After his motion for reconsideration was denied on March 29, 1993, Gov. Bolastig filed this petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, conteding that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion in issuing its resolution, suspending him from office pendente lite.
Gov. Bolastig argued that “when the Anti-Graft Law gave the courts the authority to order the preventive suspension of the accused, it never intended to impose a mindless and meaningless exercise. The exercise of such authority must always be within the confines of the legislative intent, for to go beyond it would be to exceed the bounds of the law. Preventive suspension should therefore be ordered only when the legislative purpose is achieved, that is, when “the suspension order . . . prevent(s) the accused from using his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.” Corollarily, when the legislative purpose is not achieved, preventive suspension is improper and should not be decreed.”
The Supreme Court dismissed Gov. Bolastig’s petition as unmeritorious, holding that:
“It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.”ch
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The Court explained that the “duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is decided before ninety days, then the suspension will last less than ninety days, but if the case is not decided within ninety days, then the preventive suspension must be up to ninety days only. Similarly, as applied to criminal prosecutions under Republic Act No. 3019, preventive suspension will last for less than ninety days only if the case is decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety days.”chanroblesvirt
