By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico
The novel question presented to the Supreme Court in the case of EVELYN CHUA-QUA, Petitioner, v. HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL, INC., Respondents, G. R. No. 49549, promulgated by its Second Division on August 30, 1990 and penned by Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, was that if the marriage of “a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.”
The facts of the case stated that “Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner had been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such instructions in school by petitioner. In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24, 1975, they got married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo. Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua, being sixteen (16) years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion Ong. Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on January 10, 1976.”
Tay Tung then applied with the Department of Labor for “clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner” for “abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the school.”
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Tay Tung, without a formal hearing conducted. On appeal, the the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the same. Tay Tung then elevated the case to the Ministry of Labor, which ruled in favor of Tay Tung. Evelyn appealed to the Office of the Presdent (OP), which ruled in her favor. However, on motion for reconsideration, the OP modified its decision, “giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner as classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary.”
Evelyn was thus this forced to file this petition for certiorari.virtual 1aw library
Tay Tung alleged that the “petitioner’s actuations as a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It argues that as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus, petitioner had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a “school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student.”
On her part, Evelyn stated that “there was no ground to terminate her services as there is nothing wrong with a teacher falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him. She argued that she was dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua.”
The Supreme Court stated that “the determination of the legality of the dismissal hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before us is a factual question, the resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.”
The Court continued that “(C)onsidering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual conclusions arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ of certiorari if the same is tainted by absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound thereby.”
Then, the Court stated: “We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and forcefully observed by him in his original decision:
“Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records referred to are the affidavits attached as Annexes ‘A’ to ‘D’ of the position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the arbitration proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving many questions unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off-school hours when appellant and her student were found together in one of the classrooms of the school. But the records of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial instruction to her student and the school was the most convenient place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affiants is the complete absence of specific immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and very important at that, the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but the disciplinary action imposed by appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the affidavits were executed only in August, 1976 and from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its counsel. The affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee are clearly the product of after-thought. . . . The action pursued by appellee in dismissing appellant over one month after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts committed even much earlier, is open to question. The basis of the action sought is seriously doubted; on the contrary, we are more inclined to believe that appellee had certain selfish, ulterior and undisclosed motives known only to itself.”
The Court then concluded that “(w)ith the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.”
The Court continued that “(i)t would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with and should not be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.”
The Court added that “(t)he charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.”
The Court then ordered Tay Tung “to pay petitioner backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.”
