By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico
This is an interesting case where petitioners who were minority Members of the House of Representatives filed 2 petitions before the Supreme Court, “seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
The 2 consolidated cases were decided by the Supreme Court en banc in G. R. No. 147387 on Dec. 10, 2003. The first case was entitiled: RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, ET. AL., AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., respondents. The second case was docketed as G.R. No. 152161 and was entitled: CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Associate Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr., wrote the decision for the Court en banc.
The Supreme Court first examined the legislative history of RA 9006, which started as a consolidation of several approved bills from the both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Congress then formed a Bicameral Conference Committee to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the 2 bills. A report was then made, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled.
On Feb 7, 2001, “House approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps. Fariñas and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. x x x. On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.”
On Feb. 12, 2001, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo signed RA 9006 into law.
Immediately, 2 petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court were filed before the Supreme Court, alleging:
Sec. 14 is merely a rider, hence, it is unconstitutional. This is so because “Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.”
They contended that “the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.”
Further, they contended that it also violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. “Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
Furthermore, they argued that it was also discriminatory, contending “that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains – they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.”
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the respondents, argued “that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices,” is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials.”
In order to resolve the validity of the questioned Sec. 14, RA 9006, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles that:
“Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.”
Then, the Court held: “Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider.”
It quoted Sec. 14:
“Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.”
It compared this to the repealed Sec. 67 quoted above. Then, it examined Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution:
“SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
The Court said that:
“Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.”
Then, it held that the “Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.”
“The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,” it added, “which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.”
It also examined the transcripts of the Bicameral Conference Committee for the legislative intent of Congress:
“The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. (Underscoring supplied.)”
Thereafter, the Court then held that: “Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not Violative of the of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.”
It explained that “(t)he equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. x x x.”
It said that “(b)y repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. (Underscoring supplied.)”
Then, it held that:
“Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.”
As a parting shot, the Court concluded:
“In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.”
Then, it dismissed the 2 petitions.
What is now the present state of the law? Well, as of this time, appointed officials are considered resigned from the moment they will file their certificates of candidacies (COCs). On the other hand, elective officials stay in their posts until the end of their elected term, without prejudice to the outcome of their respective election contests.
In practical terms, a mayor who wants to run for congressman will not be considered resigned the moment he files his COC. However, a city administrator or an active military officer who wants to run as mayor or councilor is considered resigned the moment he files his COC. And why the difference? The Supreme Court said that it is the wizdom of the law, which it cannot inquire into. So be it. Amen.
