By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico
The case of OGIE DIAZ, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent, G.R. No. 159787, promugated by the First Division of the Supreme Court on May 25, 2007, is a libel case involving personalities who are still known today. It illustrates how the requisites of the crime of libel should be applied.
This case started in Dec. 28, 1991, when petitioner Ogie Diaz published this article in his column “Pakurot,” on the tabloid Bandera:
“Ilang beses na nakaladkad ang pangalan ng isang Miss S sa buhay ni Philip Henson ang lalaking mahilig makipagsex sa asawa. Nasulat na sa ibang tabloid na limang beses diumanong ginalaw ni Philip ang babaing kine-claim na “nabuntis ako ni Philip.”
Dahil sa pahayag na yon ay nagpaliwanang at nagbigay pa ng detalye si Philip. Nagpa-interbyu siya sa ilang piling reporters.
At muli, babanggitin lang namin ang kanyang mga pahayag tungkol sa pagkakasangkot niya sa buhay ni Miss S.
Inamin ni Philip na limang beses niyang ginalaw si Miss S. Pero hindi ko pinasok ang akin sa ano niya dahil siya rin ang may ayaw.
Ang sabi niya kasi sa akin, isa siyang malinis na babae at hindi siya basta-basta nagpapaganuon. So ang ginawa namin, ipit method.
Yung ipitin niya iyong akin sa dalawa niyang hita kunwari sa ano niya nakapasok habang nagpa-pump ako.
Siya pa nga ang nagturo sa akin ng iba’t ibang posisyon, e yung helicopter at saka ang galing niyang bumlow job. Sanay na sanay siya.
Kahit itanong nyo pa kay Ray Ravelo. Nagalaw din siya ni Rey, pahayag ni Philip at kami mismo ang nakarining ng mga linyang iyon sa isa naming pag-uusap sa Jaloux Disco.”
In 1992, the “City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Manila an Information for libel against Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz (Ogie Frias in real life), petitioner.” The 2 accused pleaded not guilty and trial proceeded.
Complainant Florinda Bagay “testified that she is a graduate of medical secretarial course. She tried her luck in the movies under the guidance of her godmother, Mila Parawan, a writer covering the entertainment industry. Florinda adopted and used “Patricia Santillan” as her screen name.”
She said that “(d)uring her brief stint in the movies, she met Philip Henson, an aspiring bit player. A whirlwind romance between them followed and on June 16, 1988, they started living together. On March 9, 1991, she gave birth to a girl she named Maria Briana Bagay. By that time, her relationship with Philip Henson ended.”
She “claimed she was the “Miss S” alluded to in petitioner’s column “Pakurot” considering that her screen name is “Patricia Santillan.”
For their defense, accused Pichel testified “that he had been a journalist covering show business for the past 21 years. He denied having met or known the complaining witness. He also denied being the editor of Bandera. He was only its lay-out artist, a part time job.” On the other hand, accused Diaz “admitted that while he wrote the column “Pakurot” where the alleged libelous statements appeared, however, he did not know the complaining witness or “Miss S.” The source of his article was Philip Henson.”
The defense also presented 2 more witness. These are “two movie journalists – Ernie Pecho and Mario Bautista. Both had more than 50 years covering the entertainment industry.” They both testified that they have never heard of an actress named “Patricia Santillan” or a “Miss S.”
In 1998, “the trial court rendered its judgment convicting (Diaz) and Pichel of the crime charged.” On appeal, the Court of Appeals “sustained the conviction of petitioner but acquitted Pichel.” After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Diaz filed this petition for review. He asked the Supreme Court to resolve the issue of whether or not the article is libelous.
The Supreme Court first cited Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus:
“ART. 353. Definition of libel. – A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice, or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.”
This, it said, should be read in relation with Article 355 of the RPC, which states:
“ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. – A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.”
Then, it enumerated the requisites of libel. “Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. Absent one of these elements, a case for libel will not prosper.”
The Court examined the case vis-à-vis the requisites of libel:
“We find the first element present. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. In the instant case, the article in question details the sexual activities of a certain “Miss S” and one “Philip Henson” who had a romantic liaison. In their ordinary sense, the words used cast aspersion upon the character, integrity, and reputation of “Miss S.” The words convey that “Miss S” is a sexual libertine with unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a society such as ours, where modesty is still highly prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to “Miss S” by the article in question had besmirched both her character and reputation.
As to the element of malice, we find that since on its face the article is defamatory, there is a presumption that the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was neither good reason nor motive why the subject article was written except to embarrass “Miss S” and injure her reputation.
On the element of publication, there can be no question that the article appeared in the December 28, 1991 issue of Bandera, a local tabloid.
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to. Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyon (42 Phil. 757 [1922]). laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article.
The Court then held that while “(t)he libelous article, while referring to “Miss S,” does not give a sufficient description or other indications which identify “Miss S.” In short, the article fails to show that “Miss S” and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person.”
It stated that while “the article is libelous, we find that Florinda Bagay could not have been the person defamed therein. In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen (32 Phil. 624 [1915]), we held that where the requirement for an identified or identifiable victim has not been complied with, the case for libel must be dismissed.”
The Supreme Court then reversed the CA’s decision and acquitted petitioner Ogie Diaz of the crime of libel. This is because the last element of the crime of libel, which is (d) the victim must be identifiable; – is absent. The Court had stated that “(a)bsent one of these elements, a case for libel will not prosper.” This can happen even if the article complained of is defamatory, such as in this case. Well, what can I say except, “Sorry na lang, Miss S.”
