A lawyer’s grossly immoral conduct: the reasons for disbarment

By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico

 

In my previous article, I wrote about the story of Atty. Noli and Irene in the case of Guevarra vs. Eala (A. C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007), decided by the Supreme Court en banc in a per curiam decision.

Today, my dear Reader, I will write about Atty. Jun, Amalia and Anna in the case of Ceniza vs. Ceniza (A. C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019).

Amalia and Jun were married in 1989. They have 2 children. In April 2008, while Amalia was away, Jun inexplicably moved out of their house. In May 2008, Amalia went to Jun’s office to inquire about his status. His staff members told her that they suspected that he was carrying an affair with Anna. They provided her with an address. Next day, she went to this address only to be told by Anna’s sister that she had moved to a new address with her new husband, Jun. Thus, she was able to confront him. He simply denied any wrongdoing.

In July 2008, Jun filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Amalia, “alleging her psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code.” In Aug. 2008, Jun visited Amalia and asked her to ”agree to the nullification of their marriage.” But she refused.

In Nov. 2008, Amalia filed a complaint for immorality against Jun with the Ombudsman. On April 2009, she wrote a letter with the same allegations to Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, which letter was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC).

Jun filed his comment with the OBC. He denied the allegation. In April 2011, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding him “guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for having an extramarital affair with a woman in violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.” He was ordered suspended from the service for a period of 6 months without pay. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Ombudsman.

Meantime, the OBC referred Amalia’s letter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). In Oct. 2010, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) recommended the dismissal of the complaint. The IBP Board of Governors adopted this.

On Feb. 26, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a resolution, which considered the case “closed and terminated for failure of the complainant to seek a reconsideration or appeal by petition for review.” However, in June 2014, it received a letter of appeal with an attached motion for reconsideration. On recommendation of the OBC, it set aside its resolution of Feb. 26, 2014, and required Jun to file his comment. In Feb. 2016, it referred the case to the IBP, which issued resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The IBP then submitted its recommendation.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the IBP’s recommendation. But It stated that the “findings made by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case x x x more than sufficed to show (Jun’s) immorality, thereby showing his failure to live up to the legal and ethical obligations of a lawyer. In this regard, we adopt and reiterate the apt findings x x x, to wit:

“Respondent is adamant in his denial that he has a relationship with (Anna). He insists that complainant’s accusation that he was having an affair with (Anna) was purely speculative and unsupported by evidence. Complainant, for her part, presented affidavits not only of their daughter x x x, but also of two others, x x x.”

Jun and Amalia’s teenaged daughter stated in her affidavit that she “met Myrna Flores, (Anna’s) mother, (Anna) and (Anna’s) daughter. She tried to deny her relationship with my father, but just a few minutes after, I heard her three aunts tell us that she had a new husband. She identified the new husband as (Jun).” The second witness stated in his affidavit that “on December 22, 2008 at around 8:00 PM, I personally saw (Jun), taking dinner, half-naked, facing the table x x x together with a woman whom I later identified as (Anna) from the picture that Amalia x x x showed to me.” The third witness, a private investigator hired by Amalia, stated in his affidavit that he saw Jun parked his car in the house of his new address where a lady waited for him.

Amalia also presented photographs that Anna owned the house Jun frequently visited. She also presented evidence, including a marriage certificate, that Anna was married to a certain Ebrahaim Angeles Yap.

The Court held:

“In the face of the evidence presented by (Amalia), the bare denial and self-serving statements of (Jun) crumble. The positive and categorical assertions of (Amalia) and the uncontradicted statements of the witnesses x x x, have sufficiently established the administrative liability of the (Jun). x x x.”  

The Court said that:

“We are cognizant of the fact that cases like this usually entail a ‘He said – She said’ version. However, complainant was able to build her case against respondent. As afore-discussed, complainant presented evidence to support her claims. There were documentary evidence and affidavits proving, to the best of her ability, her accusations against respondent.”

The Court explained that:

“The members of the legal profession must conform to the highest standards of morality because the Code of Professional Responsibility mandated them so, to wit:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”

“There is no question,” the Court continued, “that a married person’s abandonment of his or her spouse in order to live and cohabit with another constitutes immorality. x x x. As a basis for disciplinary action, such immoral conduct, or immorality must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. That the illicit partner is himself or herself married compounds the immorality.”

What is the burden of proof required of the complainant in disbarment proceedings? The Court answered it in this manner: “Given the serious and far-reaching consequences of disbarment, only a clearly preponderant showing can warrant the imposition of the harsh penalty of disbarment. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other; it means evidence that is more convincing as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”

The Court examined the evidence presented, and said that Amalia ”presented clearly preponderant evidence showing that the respondent, while being lawfully married to her, had maintained an illicit relationship with a married woman. x x x. Time and time again, the Court pointed out that when the integrity or morality of a member of the Bar is challenged, it is not enough that he or she denies the charge, for he or she must meet the issue and overcome the evidence presented on the charge. He or she must present proof that he or she maintains the degree of integrity and morality expected of him or her at all times. The respondent failed in this regard.”

The Court then said:

“In keeping with the high standards of morality imposed upon every lawyer, the respondent should have desisted from the illicit relationship with his mistress, and should have avoided the impression on the part of the public that he was defying the moral standards required of him. His leaving his wife and family to cohabit with his married mistress definitely transgressed the clearly defined bounds of decency and morality. His transgression inflicted on his wife and children a lot of suffering, including depression, as borne out by one child’s attempt at suicide out of despair for what he had caused to their family. These circumstances were more than sufficient to establish the charge of gross immorality.”

The Court likewise stated,

“That the immoral conduct of the respondent pertained to his private life did not diminish the gravity of his ethical violation. In Advincula vs. Advincula (A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016, 793 SCRA 237, 248), we have exhorted all lawyers to always conduct themselves in a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that they are flouting the moral standards of the legal profession, thusly:

“…it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, that the possession of legal learning.”

The Court added:

“Indeed, any lawyer guilty of gross misconduct should be suspended or disbarred even if the misconduct relates to his or her personal life for as long as the misconduct evinces his or her lack of moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Every lawyer is expected to be honorable and reliable at all times, for a person who cannot abide by the laws of his private life cannot be expected to do so in his professional dealings.”

The Court concluded, my dear Reader, that:

“By his scandalous and highly immoral conduct, therefore, respondent showed that he did not possess the requisite good moral character needed for the continued practice of law. He deserves the extreme penalty of disbarment.” He was then disbarred and his name ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.